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BOYS WILL BE GIRLS, AND GIRLS WILL BE BOYS: 
URGING THE SUPREME COURT TO RECOGNIZE A 
TRANSGENDER STUDENT’S RIGHT TO USE THE 
APPROPRIATE FACILITIES IN A FEDERALLY FUNDED 
SCHOOL 
Dianna Felberbaum* 
 INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, Americans have increasingly become more 
aware about gender identity and how gender has evolved to mean more 
than just the biological assignment an individual was given at birth.1  
This is due to the fact that not only are individuals becoming more 
comfortable questioning their gender identity due to increased 
acceptance of transgender individuals in society, but also because 
individuals are questioning their gender identities at a younger age.2  
As a result, schools throughout the nation have “increasingly . . . 
adopted policies protecting transgender students from discrimination, 
providing that transgender students be allowed to use restrooms and 
locker rooms and participate in sports in accordance with their gender 
identity.”3  However, there is vast inconsistency with how the nation’s 
 
*J.D. Candidate 2018, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; TOURO LAW REVIEW, 
Associate Editor; B.A. in English, Stony Brook University. I would like to thank Professor 
Rena Seplowitz and Megan Forbes for their guidance and support.  
1 Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender Expression as Protected Speech in the 
Modern Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE. 89, 102-03 (2015) (defining 
“gender” as “that gender classification with which an individual identifies-an individual’s own 
sense of being male or female or something in between ‘whether or not that gender-related 
identity . . . is different from that traditionally associated with the person’s physiology or 
assigned sex at birth,’” defining “gender expression” as referring “to an individual’s ‘external 
characteristics and behaviors that are socially defined as either masculine or feminine, such as 
dress, mannerisms, speech patterns and social interactions,’” and defining a “transgender” as 
“an umbrella term encompassing the state of one’s gender identity or expression being 
inconsistent with that individual’s assigned sex at birth.”).  
2 Id. at 99.  
3 Id. at 113. 
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federally funded school systems handle the presence of transgender 
students.4  The lack of uniformity of laws protecting transgender 
students is due to a split in the Circuit Courts of the United States.5  As 
a result, “schools are blindly navigating an unplowed terrain.”6  The 
most effective way to create uniformity in the absence of congressional 
action for these students is with definitive guidance from the Supreme 
Court of the United States.   
The nation’s public education system and its transgender 
students were supposed to receive this desperately needed guidance in 
October 2017, when the Supreme Court was scheduled to hear G.G. v. 
Gloucester County School Board.7  In fact, the matter proved to be so 
urgent that the Court moved the hearing to the end of March 2017.8  
However, on February 22, 2017, President Donald Trump withdrew 
special guidance that would protect transgender students in federally 
funded schools.9  As a result, the Supreme Court reversed its decision 
to hear the case, and in one sentence, sent the case back down to the 
Fourth Circuit.10  The Court explained that the first issue11 before it 
concerned the guidance document given by former President Barack 
 
4 Id. at 112-14. 
5 See generally G.G. ex rel. Grimm. v. Gloucester County School Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th 
Cir. 2016); Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College Dist., 325 Fed. App’x. 492 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
6 Weatherby, supra note 1, at 104. 
7 Gloucester County Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017); see also Moriah Balingit & 
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Takes Up School Bathroom Rules for Transgender Students, 
THE WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-takes-up-school-
bathroom-rules-for-transgender-students/2016/10/28/0eece4ea-917f-11e6-a6a3-
d50061aa9fae_story.html?utm_term=.f56d225e16c9. 
8 Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., SCOTUS BLOG (last visited Apr. 7. 2016), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/gloucester-county-school-board-v-g-g/. 
9 Letter from Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, to Scott S. Harris, Clerk for the 
Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file with author), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/16-273-2.22.17-DOJ-Cover-Letter-
Guidance.pdf.  
10 G.G., 137 S. Ct. at 1239 (“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of the guidance 
document issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 
2017.”); see also SCOTUS BLOG, supra note 8. 
11 Brief for Respondent at i, Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., 2017 WL 766063 
(2017) (No. 16-273) (listing the first question presented as “[w]hether the Gloucester County 
School Board’s policy, which prohibits school administrators from allowing boys and girls 
who are transgender to use the restrooms that other boys and girls use, constitutes 
“discrimination” “on the basis of sex” under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
20 U.S.C § 1681(a)?”) [hereinafter “Brief for Respondent”].  
2
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Obama which current President Donald Trump subsequently 
withdrew, and the second issue12 regarded the school’s policy which 
was unrelated to former President Obama’s guidance.13  As a result, 
the Fourth Circuit was required to “take a closer look” at the school’s 
policy without any additional guidance from the Supreme Court.14  
However, it was argued that the Fourth Circuit could affirm “the 
judgment on any ground supported by the record”15 because despite 
the guidance’s withdrawal, “the meaning of Title IX and 34 C.F.R § 
106.33 will remain the same.”16  What is most troubling is that both 
Gavin—the plaintiff in this case—and the school board agreed that the 
Supreme Court should hear the case.17 
This note will argue that the Fourth Circuit should affirm its 
previous ruling, allowing the parties to appeal to the Supreme Court, 
which should hold that federally funded schools are required to allow 
transgender students to use the restroom associated with their gender 
identity.  Part I of this note will provide an overview of the individual 
rights at issue in this circuit split.  These individual rights are 
established by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, Title VII, Title IX, 34 
C.F.R. § 106.33 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Part II will identify and discuss 
the circuit split that exists on this issue between the Fourth Circuit, in 
G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, and the Ninth Circuit, in 
Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District.  Part III will 
provide an overview of Petitioner Gloucester County School Board’s 
petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, as well as 
identify the questions the Supreme Court should have addressed in 
G.G. and should address in the future.  Part IV will highlight key 
Supreme Court cases that demonstrate that if the Supreme Court were 
 
12 Id. (listing the second question presented as “[w]hether the Department of Education’s 
conclusion that 34 C.F.R § 106.33 does not authorize schools to exclude boys and girls who 
are transgender from the restrooms that other boys and girls use - as set forth in an opinion 
letter, statement of interest, and amicus brief - is entitled to deference under Auer v. Robbins, 
519 U.S. 452 (1997)?”).  
13 Amy Rowe, Justices Send Transgender Bathroom Case Back to Lower Courts, No Action 
on Same-sex Marriage Cake Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2017), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/justices-send-transgender-bathroom-case-back-lower-
courts/. 
14 Id.  
15 Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 26 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166 
(1997)).  
16 Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 26. 
17 Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 26. 
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to hold that federally funded schools are required to allow transgender 
students to use the restroom associated with their gender identity, 
based upon giving deference to the Department of Education’s 
interpretation of what constitutes discrimination under Title IX, this 
ruling would be consistent with existing precedent.  Part V will discuss 
key lower court cases that would support a Supreme Court decision to 
hold that federally funded schools are required to allow transgender 
students to use the restroom associated with their gender identity.  
Finally, Part VI will provide a conclusion along with recommendations 
for both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit in how they should 
hold in this case as well as future cases involving the rights of 
transgender students in the public-school system.  
I. OVERVIEW OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, TITLE VII, TITLE IX, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33, 
AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
The liberty interests afforded to transgender students, which 
give them the right to use the bathroom associated with their gender 
identity in public schools, are rooted in several different areas of the 
law that work together to protect these individuals from impermissible 
discrimination. First, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution states that: 
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.18  
Second, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based 
on “race, color, religion, sex or national origin,”19 which complements 
Title IX’s prohibition of discrimination “on the basis of sex.”20  In 
addition, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 allows for comparable facilities for 
“separate toilet, locker rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of 
 
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991).  
20 20 U.S.C § 1681(a) (1986).  
4
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sex,” as long as the facilities are  “comparable” for both sexes.21  In 
order to allege a Title IX violation, a plaintiff must show “1) that the 
plaintiff was excluded from participation in an education program 
based on sex; 2) that the educational institution was receiving federal 
financial assistance at the time of exclusion; and 3) that the improper 
discrimination caused the plaintiff harm.”22  Lastly, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
states: 
Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be 
subjected . . . any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress.23 
When determining the scope of rights afforded to transgender 
students in the public- school system, it will be critical for the courts 
to turn to the above-mentioned provisions in order to ensure that these 
students are being treated equally among their peers.  Furthermore, as 
discussed below, the courts should also seek guidance from the 
Department of Education’s interpretation of these regulations in 
evaluating school policies that discriminate against transgender 
students.   
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT  
A.  The Fourth Circuit 
In G.G., Gavin, a transgender male high school student, who 
was biologically born a female, argued that his public school, 
Gloucester County School, wrongfully discriminated against him in 
“violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Title IX.”24  G.G argued that the school wrongfully 
discriminated against him by banning him from using the men’s 
restrooms.25   
 
21 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2000).  
22 G.G., 822 F.3d at 718. 
23 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).  
24 G.G., 822 F.3d at 715-16. 
25 Id. at 714.  
5
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The United States Department of Education (hereinafter 
“DOE”) enforces Title IX to allow for “separate toilet, locker room, 
and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided 
for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities for 
students of the other sex.”26  The Gloucester County School Board 
(hereinafter “Gloucester Board”) wrote a letter to the DOE asking for 
advice on how to handle this matter.27  The DOE responded and 
interpreted how Title IX should apply to transgender individuals.28  
The letter stated, “when a school elects to separate or treat students 
differently on the basis of sex . . . a school generally must treat 
transgender students consistent with their gender identity.”29 
At the beginning of his sophomore year, Gavin’s mother 
informed the school that Gavin was transgender.30  The school was 
supportive and made sure that all staff treated Gavin as a male.31  At 
first, the school permitted Gavin to use the male restroom.32  Gavin 
used the male restroom without any issues for approximately seven 
weeks until community members, including parents of students who 
attend the school, contacted the school and objected to his use of the 
men’s restroom.33  Members of the community argued at school 
district meetings that Gavin should not be allowed to use the men’s 
restroom.34  They argued that Gavin’s use of the men’s restroom 
violated other students’ privacy, his use would lead to sexual assault 
in restrooms, and would cause non-transgender males to come to 
school wearing dresses in order to gain access to the women’s 
restroom.35  One community member said that Gavin “has no right, or 
she has no right to use a bathroom where the men are exposed. That 
makes them uncomfortable. It makes me uncomfortable.”36  Another 
community member said that bathrooms “are divided by sex not 
gender, not some made up term that some organization wants you to 
 
26 Id. at 715; 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2000).  
27 G.G., 822 F.3d at 715. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id.  
32 G.G., 822 F.3d at 715. 
33 Id. at 715-16. 
34 Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7.  
35 Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7. 
36 Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7. 
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believe as the truth.”37  Additionally, a different member of the 
community said, “[w]e do not want a policy of biological boys and 
biological girls in the same facility where an expectation of privacy 
exists.”38 
In response to the school district meetings, Gavin was 
interviewed and said: 
It was humiliating to have a publically facilitated 
discussion about a minor’s genitals and bathroom 
usage. It was very dehumanizing. It was almost as if I 
was another topic on a budget list or some sort of 
zoning management claim. It was as if there wasn’t a 
real person that was suffering in this case. What they 
did was send a message that this student is different. I 
am the only student in that High School required to use 
a separate alternate facility whereas my peers are free 
to use the restrooms in align with their gender identities. 
To go back to school after a public discussion has been 
had about your genitals explicitly and bathroom usage, 
it feels like you’re in one of those nightmares where you 
go to school without underwear except for it actually 
was really happening. It was humiliating. It felt like I 
had been stripped of all agency, privacy, all humanity 
that I had. Transgender people are real people with real 
needs. It is time for us to have a platform.39 
After the community members’ objections, the school 
suspended Gavin’s use of the men’s restroom.40  In response to his 
suspension, Gavin argued that he could not use the women’s restroom 
because he would physically appear as a male in the women’s 
restroom.41  As a result, the women in the women’s restroom would 
see Gavin as a man in the women’s restroom, and “react negatively,” 
for example, by yelling at him and telling him to leave because men 
are not allowed in the women’s restroom. 42  He further argued that 
using the women’s restroom would cause him severe psychological 
 
37 Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7. 
38 Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7. 
39 Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7. 
40 G.G., 822 F.3d at 716.  
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
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distress and would be inconsistent with his treatment for gender 
dysphoria.43  In response to Gavin’s objections, the school provided an 
alternative, gender-neutral restroom for him to use; however, he also 
objected to the use of this restroom.44  He explained that the gender-
neutral restroom would make him feel even more stigmatized because 
“it sets him apart from his peers and served as a daily reminder that the 
school views him as ‘different.’”45  
The Fourth Circuit held in favor of Gavin, stating that the 
DOE’s letter interpreting its Title IX regulation permitting schools to 
provide sex-segregated bathrooms, in which the Department instructed 
that schools must treat transgender students consistent with their 
gender identity if they provided sex-segregated bathrooms, was 
entitled to Auer deference.46  The Auer deference doctrine established 
by the Supreme Court states, “when an agency interprets its own 
regulation it is entitled to near-absolute deference,” unless its 
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”47  The Auer deference is not applicable when it appears 
that the interpretation is no more than a convenient litigating position 
or when the interpretation is a post-hoc rationalization.48   
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the DOE’s interpretation of 
its regulation, Title IX, is consistent with prior interpretation because 
although the DOE’s interpretation is “novel,” as the Supreme Court 
previously explained, “novelty alone is no reason to refuse 
 
43 Id.; Weatherby, supra note 1, at 110 (defining gender dysphoria as “simply the diagnosis 
that attaches to individuals manifesting the “clinically significant distress” associated with the 
conflict over their gender identity.”). 
44 G.G., 822 F.3d at 716-17.  
45 Id.; Weatherby, supra note 1, at 122 (“[A]n individual’s conduct in using a restroom 
designated as either ‘male’ or ‘female’ expresses that individual’s belief that she belongs in 
that designated category of persons.  By choosing to enter a facility labeled for a specific 
gender group, that individual is effectively stating her association with that gender.  Although 
no words may ever be uttered, there is a strong mental association between the designation 
affixed to a restroom door and the fact that only those individuals identifying with that 
designation would enter and use that facility.  Therefore, since a transgender student’s 
selection of a particular restroom is ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,’ 
the conduct is expressive and sends a particularized message about the student’s gender 
identity.”) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).  
46 G.G., 822 F.3d at 723.  
47 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1324 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–463 (1997)); see also Nicholas R. Bednar, Defying 
Auer Deference: Skidmore as a Solution to Conservative Concerns in Perez v. Mortgage 
Bankers Association, MINN. L. REV. VOL 100 (2015).  
48 G.G., 822 F.3d at 722.  
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deference.”49  The court continued to explain that the interpretation is 
a legitimate position because the DOE “has consistently enforced this 
position since 2014.”50  Moreover, it reasoned that the DOE’s 
interpretation is not a post-hoc rationalization because “it is in line with 
the existing guidance and regulations of a number of federal agencies, 
all of which provide that transgender individuals should be permitted 
access to the restroom that corresponds with their gender identities.”51  
B.  The Ninth Circuit 
In Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District,52 
Rebecca Kastl, a transgender female college student, who was 
biologically born a male, argued that Maricopa County Community 
College wrongfully discriminated against her in violation of Title VII, 
Title IX and her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.53  
Rebecca argued that she was wrongfully discriminated against when 
the community college denied her access to the women’s restroom.54  
The school banned her from using the women’s restroom until she 
could prove that she had completed a “sex reassignment surgery.”55 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
school, and Rebecca appealed this judgment.56  On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision that Rebecca was properly 
banned from using the women’s restroom.57  The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that Rebecca stated a “prima facie case of gender 
discrimination under Title IV based on the theory that impermissible 
gender stereotypes were a motivating factor” in the school’s decision 
to ban her from the women’s restroom.58  However, the Ninth Circuit 
found that Rebecca’s claims of gender discrimination failed.59  The 
court reasoned that the establishment of a prima facie case is not 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 325 F. App’x 493 (9th Cir. 2009). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  
56 Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College Dist., 2006 WL 2460636, at *8 (D. Ariz. 
2006).  
57 Kastl, 325 F. App’x at 494. 
58 Id. at 493. 
59 Id. at 493-94. 
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sufficient to overcome a summary judgment motion.60  The court 
found that the school provided sufficient evidence that Rebecca was 
banned from using the women’s restroom for safety reasons.61  
Ultimately, the court concluded that Rebecca failed to provide 
sufficient evidence to prove that the school was motivated by her 
gender to ban her from the restroom.62 
III. GLOUCESTER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD’S PETITION FOR A 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN G.G. EX REL. 
The Gloucester Board argued that the Supreme Court should 
grant its petition for three reasons: 
First, this case provides an excellent vehicle to 
reconsider, refine or abolish the Auer doctrine. Second, 
if the Supreme Court decides to retain Auer in some 
form, this case provides an excellent way to resolve 
important disagreements among the lower courts about 
Auer’s proper application. Third, this case provides an 
excellent example to determine whether the 
Department of Education’s understanding of Title IX 
reflected in the ‘Ferg-Cadima’63 and ‘Dear 
Colleague’64 letters must be given effect, thereby 
resolving once and for all the current nationwide 
controversy generated by these directives.65  
Shortly after the Gloucester Board’s decision to ban Gavin 
from using the men’s restroom, Emily T. Prince, one of Gloucester 
Board’s attorneys, wrote to the DOE asking for “guidance or rules” 
relevant to this decision.66  On January 7, 2015, James A. Ferg-
Cadima, an Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the 
Department’s Office of Civil Rights, responded and stated  that “Title 
 
60 Id. at 494.  
61 Id. at 493-94.  
62 Kastl, 325 F. App’x at 494. 
63 See generally Letter from James A. Ferg-Cadima to the Gloucester School Board at 121a 
(May 13, 2016) (on file with author).  
64 See generally Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon and Vanita Gupta to the Gloucester 
School Board, 126a (May 13, 2016) (on file with author). 
65 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Gloucester County School Bd., 2016 WL 4610979 
(2016) (No. 16-273). 
66 Id. at 8.  
10
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IX… prohibits recipients of Federal financial assistance from 
discriminating on the basis of sex, including gender identity,” and 
further that “Title IX regulations permit schools to provide sex-
segregated restrooms, locker rooms, shower facilities, housing, athletic 
teams, and single-sex classes under certain circumstances.”67  As a 
result, Ferg-Cadima concluded that “when a school elects to separate 
or treat students differently on the basis of sex in those situations, a 
school generally must treat transgender students consistent with their 
gender identity.”68  Shortly after the Fourth Circuit’s decision in G.G. 
gave the Ferg-Cadima letter Auer deference, the DOE, as well as the 
Department of Justice, wrote a “Dear Colleague” letter seeking to 
impose that same requirement on every Title IX-covered educational 
institution in the nation.69 
On October 28, 2016, the Supreme Court granted a Writ of 
Certiorari to the Gloucester Board in G.G.70  The Supreme Court 
limited the questions it would address to the following two issues:  
(1) [w]hether courts should extend deference to an 
unpublished agency letter that, among other things, 
does not carry the force of law and was adopted in the 
context of the very dispute in which deference is 
sought; and (2) whether, with or without deference to 
the agency, the Department of Education’s specific 
interpretation of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 . . . 
should be given effect.71  
On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “for 
further consideration in light of the guidance document issued by the 
Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 
2017.”72 
 
 
 
 
 
67 Id. (emphasis added).  
68 Id. 
69 Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon and Vanita Gupta, supra note 64.  
70 SCOTUS BLOG, supra note 8. 
71 SCOTUS BLOG, supra note 8. 
72 SCOTUS BLOG, supra note 8. 
11
Felberbaum: Rights of Transgender Students
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
1054 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
 
IV. IF THE SUPREME COURT WERE TO RULE THAT FEDERALLY 
FUNDED SCHOOLS ARE REQUIRED TO ALLOW 
TRANSGENDER STUDENTS TO USE THE RESTROOM 
ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR GENDER IDENTITY, THE RULING 
WOULD BE COSISTENT WITH PRECEDENT   
A.  Review of Supreme Court Cases  
The argument that the Court should give deference to the 
Department of Education’s interpretation of Title IX, which gives 
transgender students the right to use the facilities that associates with 
their gender identity, is consistent with existing precedent where the 
Court has also given deference to an agency’s interpretation of their 
own regulations.  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,73 the Supreme 
Court held that sex discrimination that violates Title VII includes 
differential treatment positioned on “sex based” considerations which 
include gender.74  In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was denied a 
position as a partner at an accounting firm because, in the opinion of 
the partners of the accounting firm, she did not meet the standards of 
how a woman should be portrayed.75  The Court reasoned that this 
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII because 
Hopkins was subjected to differential treatment solely because of 
considerations based on her gender and because she “failed to act like 
a woman.”76  
In Auer v. Robbins,77 the Supreme Court held that the Secretary 
of Labor’s interpretation of its own regulation was entitled to 
deference.78  In that case, police sergeants sued their employer, the St. 
Louis Police Department.79  The sergeants argued that they were 
entitled to overtime payment under § 7(a)(1) of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 (hereinafter “FLSA”).80  Section 213(a)(1) of 
the FLSA exempts “bona fide executive, administrative, or 
 
73 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  
74 Id. at 241-42. 
75 Id. at 234-35. 
76 Id. at 258.  
77 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
78 Id. at 453.  
79 Id. at 455.  
80 Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2010).  
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professional” employees from overtime pay requirements.81  In 
response, the St. Louis Police Department argued that the sergeants 
were not entitled to the overtime pay because they fell under this 
exemption as “bona fide executive, administrative or professional 
employees.”82  Under the FLSA, one of the requirements needed to 
qualify under the exemption is that the employee must earn a specified 
minimum amount of money on a “salary basis.”83  According to the 
FLSA, an employee is paid under a salary basis if “under his 
employment agreement he regularly receives each pay period on a 
weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all 
or part of his compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction 
because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work 
performed.”84   
The sergeants argued “that the ‘salary basis’ test was not met 
in their case because under the terms of the St. Louis Metropolitan 
Police Department Manual, their compensation could be reduced for a 
variety of disciplinary infractions related to the ‘quality or quantity’ of 
the work that they performed.”85  However, the Secretary of Labor 
interpreted the “salary basis” test and determined that the test is 
satisfied when an employee’s compensation may not, “as a practical 
matter,” be adjusted in ways inconsistent with the test.86  Furthermore, 
the Secretary of Labor determined that the “salary basis” test is 
violated if there is either an actual practice of making deductions, or 
an employment policy that creates a “significant likelihood” of 
deductions.87  The Supreme Court explained that since the words 
“subject to,” the regulation’s critical phrase, “comfortably bears the 
meaning the Secretary assigns,” the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation 
of its own test was not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation,” and was therefore controlling.88  
In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,89 the Supreme 
Court held that the unequal treatment of a public high school’s girls’ 
 
81 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2014).  
82 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 455 (1997).   
83 Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (2014); 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(e) (2014); 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(e) 
(2014).  
84 Auer, 519 U.S. at 455. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 461.  
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 544 U.S. 167 (2005).  
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basketball team in comparison with the boys’ basketball team was a 
violation of the girls’ rights under Title IX.90  In that case, Roderick 
Jackson was the coach of the girls’ sports teams at Ensley Public High 
School.91  He discovered that the girls’ teams were not receiving equal 
funding or equipment in comparison with the boys’ sporting teams.92  
As a result, Roderick confronted the school and argued that the unequal 
treatment was not only unfair, but that it kept him from adequately 
doing his job.93  The school did not respond to his complaints.94  
Roderick was subsequently fired for not adequately doing his job.95  
Roderick sued the school and argued the school discriminated against 
him in violation of Title IX when he was fired in retaliation for 
complaining about sex discrimination.96 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that 
retaliation constituted discrimination in Roderick’s case, and therefore 
the school violated Title IX.97  The Court found that in previous Title 
IX violation cases, Title IX “broadly” prohibits a funding recipient 
from subjecting any person to “discrimination . . . on the basis of 
sex.”98  Retaliation against a person who has complained about sex 
discrimination is a form of intentional sex discrimination that is 
protected by Title IX.99  Retaliation is an intentional act which is a form 
of “discrimination” because the complainant is being subjected to 
differential treatment.100  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
discrimination is a term that covers a wide range of intentional unequal 
treatment101 and that Congress intended to give the statute a long reach 
by using such a broad term as discrimination.102  
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,103 the Supreme Court held that an agency has the authority to 
 
90 Id. at 171. 
91 Id. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 171-72.  
94 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171-72.  
95 Id. at 172. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 178. 
98 Id. at 173.  
99 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 175.  
103 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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interpret its own statute.104  In 1977, Congress encouraged states to 
meet the Environmental Protection Agency’s (hereinafter “EPA”) 
standards through the Clean Air Act Amendments (hereinafter “CAA 
Amendments”).105  The CAA Amendments require states to enact 
programs that regulate “new or modified major stationary sources of 
air pollution.”106  The CAA Amendments allow a state to adopt a 
definition of the phrase “stationary source.”107  That definition is then 
controlling in determining when “an existing plant that contains 
several pollution emitting devices may install or modify one piece of 
equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration will 
not increase the total emissions from the plant.”108 
The Supreme Court held that the program agencies were 
entitled to deference in interpreting the meaning of the “stationary 
source.”109  The Court reasoned that when a court analyzes an agency’s 
interpretation of its own statute there are two questions the Court must 
ask.110  The first question is “whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.”111  Accordingly, “if the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”112  Yet, if “the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute . . . .”113  The Court 
continued to state that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue, the [second] question for the court to ask is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”114   
In Chevron, the Court acknowledged that the statute was silent 
on the specific issue and, therefore, the Court must ask whether the 
EPA’s definition of “stationary source” is based on a reasonable 
 
104 Id. at 866. 
105 Id. at 839-40. 
106 Id. at 840. 
107 Id. 
108 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).   
109 Id. at 866. 
110 Id. at 842. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
114 Id. 
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interpretation of the statute.115  The Court found that the EPA’s 
definition of “stationary source” was based on a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute because the statute “seeks to accommodate 
progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth.”116  The 
Court explained that:  
the language may reasonably be interpreted to impose 
the requirement on any discrete, but integrated, 
operation which pollutes.  This gives meaning to all of 
the terms; a single building, not part of a larger 
operation, would be covered if it emits more than one-
hundred tons of pollution, as would any facility, 
structure, or installation.117   
The EPA interpreted the phrase “stationary source” to mean “any 
building, structure, facility, or installation” that emits air pollution.118  
Furthermore, the Court explained that it has: 
long recognized that considerable weight should be 
accorded to an executive department’s construction of 
a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the 
principle of deference to administrative interpretations. 
It has been consistently followed by this Court 
whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a 
statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, 
and a full understanding of the force of the statutory 
policy in the given situation has depended upon more 
than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters 
subjected to agency regulations.119 
B.  Analysis of Supreme Court Cases 
If the Supreme Court were to hold that federally funded schools 
are required to allow transgender students to use the restroom 
associated with their gender identities, it would be consistent with the 
 
115 Id. at 843-44. 
116 Id. at 866. 
117 Id. at 861. 
118 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 861-62.  
119 Id. at 844. 
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Court’s prior rulings in Price Waterhouse,120 Auer,121 Jackson,122 and 
Chevron.123  The Court expressly established in Price Waterhouse that 
differential treatment based on sex, like the differential treatment 
Gavin is being subjected to, is sex discrimination in violation of Title 
VII.124  As the Court ruled in Auer and Chevron, and as the Fourth 
Circuit has already held, it is appropriate for an agency to be afforded 
deference to interpret the meaning of its own regulations.125  Although 
former President Obama’s guidance was withdrawn by President 
Trump, “the meaning of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 [] remain[s] 
the same.”126   
In Gavin’s case, the DOE was asked to interpret its own 
regulation, Title IX, in relation to the use of restrooms by transgender 
students in Gloucester County Public School.127  The DOE interpreted 
Title IX and determined that “when a school elects to separate or treat 
students differently on the basis of sex . . . a school generally must treat 
transgender students consistent with their gender identity.”128  This 
Court previously reasoned in Auer that an agency’s interpretation of 
its own regulation is not plainly erroneous when a statute’s critical 
phrases “comfortably bear the meaning to which it is assigned.”129  In 
Gavin’s case, Title IX “comfortably bears the meaning to which” the 
DOE assigns.130  Title IX’s critical phrase prohibiting “discrimination 
on the basis of sex” establishes that a public school may not 
discriminate against a student on the basis of sex.131  As the Supreme 
Court ruled in Jackson,132 an individual is discriminated against when 
they are subjected to “differential treatment.”133  When a public high 
school requires only one student out of the entire school population to 
 
120 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
121 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
122 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
123 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
124 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.  
125 See generally Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005); Auer 
v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 455 (1997); G.G. ex rel. Grimm. v. Gloucester County School Bd., 
822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016). 
126 Letter from Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, supra note 9. 
127 G.G., 822 F.3d at 715. 
128 Id. 
129 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. 
130 Id. 
131 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1986).  
132 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74. 
133 Id. at 172. 
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use a separate alternate restroom facility, while all other students and 
staff members are free to use the restrooms aligned with their gender 
identity, this is a clear example of differential treatment.134  As the 
Court has already established, discrimination of an individual through 
differential treatment is a violation of Title IX.135  Accordingly, Title 
IX comfortably bears the meaning to which the DOE assigns because 
the DOE’s interpretation is that “a school must treat transgender 
students consistent with their gender identity” and, thus, may not 
discriminate against transgender students by subjecting them to 
differential treatment.136  
Additionally, according to the Court’s previous reasoning in 
Chevron, in analyzing an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, 
the appropriate question to ask is whether the agency’s definition is 
based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute.137  A reasonable 
interpretation of Title IX is that discriminating and subjecting someone 
to differential treatment on the basis of sex is prohibited.138 
V. IF THE SUPREME COURT RULES THAT FEDERALLY FUNDED 
SCHOOLS ARE REQUIRED TO ALLOW TRANSGENDER 
STUDENTS TO USE THE RESTROOM ASSOCIATED WITH 
THEIR GENDER IDENTITY, THE RULING WOULD BE 
CONSISTENT WITH LOWER COURT PRECEDENT 
A.  Review of Lower Court Cases 
In Schwenk v. Hartford,139 the Ninth Circuit held that sex 
discrimination includes any “differential treatment based on a 
consideration ‘related to the sex of’ the individual.”140  In this case, 
Crystal Schwenk was a transgender individual who was biologically 
born a male.141  She was diagnosed with gender dysphoria at a young 
age.142  Although Schwenk had not undergone sex reassignment 
 
134 Id. at 173-74. 
135 Id. 
136 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. 
137 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
138 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173. 
139 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2010).  
140 Id. at 1202. 
141 Id. at 1193. 
142 Id. 
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surgery, she identified as a woman, both physically and mentally.143  
While incarcerated, a prison guard was told that Schwenk was a 
transgender.144  Once the prison guard was informed of this 
information, the guard began treating her differently than non-
transgender inmates.145   
The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Price Waterhouse and concluded that under Title VII, sex included 
both biological sex and gender.146  As a result, the court reasoned the 
terms “sex” and “gender” are “interchangeable.”147  Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit found that the prison guard’s actions were “at least in 
part” motivated by Schwenk’s gender148 because the prison guard 
began to treat her differently from non-transgender inmates only upon 
learning that she was transgender.149  As a result, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the actions constituted differential treatment as defined 
by the Supreme Court, which violated Title VII and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.150  
In Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio,151 the Sixth Circuit held that a 
transgender’s Title VII rights were violated when the individual was 
subjected to gender discrimination.152  In this case, plaintiff Jimmie L. 
Smith was biologically born a male but identified as a female.153  Smith 
was diagnosed with gender dysphoria154 and began to undergo a sex 
change by changing her physical appearance to become more 
feminine.155  Her co-workers noticed these changes.156  As a result, her 
co-workers held a meeting and determined that Smith needed to 
undergo multiple psychological evaluations because she was a 
 
143 Id. 
144 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1193. 
145 Id. at 1193-94. 
146 Id. at 1202.  
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202. 
150 Id. 
151 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
152 Id. at 572. 
153 Id. at 568. 
154 Id.  
155 Id. 
156 Smith, 378 F.3d at 569. 
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transgender.157  However, none of the non-transgender employees had 
to undergo such evaluation.158   
The Sixth Circuit held that forcing Smith to undergo 
psychological evaluations because she was a transgender constituted 
unconstitutional gender discrimination because, as the Supreme Court 
established in Price, sex discrimination includes differential treatment 
based on sex.159  The Sixth Circuit explained that “sex stereotyping 
based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible 
discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such 
as ‘trans[gender],’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the 
victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-
conformity.”160  As a result, the Sixth Circuit determined that 
“discrimination against a plaintiff who is trans[gender]—and therefore 
fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from 
the discrimination directed against [the plaintiff] in Price 
Waterhouse,” which the Supreme Court determined was 
unconstitutional.”161   
In Carcaño v. McCrory Berger,162 the District Court for the 
District of Maryland held that students of a federally funded school 
were “likely to succeed on the merits of their Title IX claim that the 
law violated Title IX by discriminating against them on the basis of 
sex.”163  In this case, transgender students sued their federally funded 
public school.164  The students argued that a state law mandating that 
restrooms and changing facilities could only be used by individuals 
based on their biological sex discriminated against transgender 
individuals in violation of Title IX as well as the Equal Protection and 
Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.165  The students’ 
first argument was that the state law violated Title IX because the law 
subjected them to unconstitutional differential treatment.166  The state 
law required public entities to ensure that restrooms and other similar 
 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 572. 
160 Id. at 575. 
161 Smith, 378 F.3d at 575.  
162 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016) 
163 Id. at 615; 632-33. 
164 Id. at 621. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
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facilities were used by individuals based on their biological sex.167  The 
North Carolina law defined biological sex as the sex listed on an 
individual’s birth certificate.168   
The District Court reasoned that the students were excluded 
from a federally funded educational program because of their sex.169  
The court found that this violated Title IX because it provides:  
‘[n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance’ . . . . As a result, institutions may not ‘limit 
any person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, 
advantage, or opportunity’ on the basis of sex.170   
Under Title IX, “access to bathrooms, showers, and other similar 
facilities qualifies as a ‘right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity.’”171  
The school’s enforcement of the North Carolina law caused the 
students medical harm, among other injuries.172 
In analyzing the students’ second claim that they were 
discriminated against, the court stated that to evaluate a Title IX claim,  
the court must undertake a two-part analysis.  First, the 
court must determine whether the North Carolina law 
violates Title IX’s general prohibition against sex 
discrimination.  Second, if the North Carolina law does 
violate Title IX’s general prohibition against sex 
discrimination, the court must then determine whether 
an exception to that general prohibition applies.173   
In analyzing the first part of the test, the court observed that the 
Supreme Court established in Jackson that, “Title IX is a broadly 
written general prohibition on discrimination, followed by specific, 
narrow exceptions to that broad prohibition.”174  The court 
acknowledged that one of the DOE regulations that permits schools to 
 
167 Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 621. 
168 Id.  
169 Id. at 622. 
170 Id. at 633.  
171 Id. at 650. 
172 Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 635. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 635-36. 
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“provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis 
of sex,” is a potential exception.175  However, the court looked to G.G., 
which stated that “the court must give controlling weight to the DOE 
opinion letter, which states that schools ‘generally must treat 
transgender students consistent with their gender identity,’ when 
considering the scope of this exception during the second stage of the 
analysis.”176  As a result, the court found that the North Carolina law 
requires that schools allow students to use restrooms and similar 
facilities on the basis of sex.177  Because the provision of sex-
segregated facilities requires schools to treat individuals differently 
depending on their sex, the North Carolina law fell within Title IX’s 
general prohibition against sex discrimination.178  
In analyzing the second part of the test, the only potentially 
applicable exception is regulation § 106.33,179 which allows for sex-
segregated bathrooms and similar facilities.180  However, the court 
looked to G.G. and the DOE opinion letter which stated that a school 
must treat students consistent with their gender identity.181  In contrast, 
the North Carolina law required “schools to treat students consistent 
with their birth certificates, regardless of gender identity.”182  The court 
reasoned that although the North Carolina law “is consistent with the 
DOE opinion letter when applied to most students, it is inconsistent 
with the DOE opinion letter as applied to the individual transgender 
Plaintiffs, whose birth certificates do not align with their gender 
identities.”183  Consequently, the court determined that the North 
Carolina school’s actions do not fall within the exception.184 
In Schroer v. Billington,185 the District Court for the District of 
Columbia held that a transgender job applicant was discriminated 
against on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.186  In that case, the 
plaintiff, Diane Schroer, was a transgender female who was born a 
 
175 Id. at 636. 
176 Id. 
177 Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 636. 
178 Id. at 636.  
179 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2000).  
180 Carcaño, F. Supp. 3d at 636.  
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id.  
185 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
186 Id. at 308. 
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male.187  Diane applied for a job as a “[s]pecialist in Terrorism and 
International Crime” with the Congressional Research Service at the 
Library of Congress.188  However, she applied for the job prior to 
holding herself out as a woman.189  Thus, she applied for the job as 
“David J. Schroer,” the name she was legally given at birth.190  
Nevertheless, Diane was well qualified for the job and as a result was 
offered the position.191  However, when Diane informed the employer 
that she was a transgender and planned to undergo sex reassignment 
surgery prior to starting her employment, the employer rescinded her 
offer of employment.192  The employer claimed that her transition 
would “divert” her “full attention away from the mission” at the 
library.193   
The court found that the employer’s decision to rescind Diane 
employment offer was based on sex stereotyping.194   The court 
reasoned that under Title VII, it does not matter “whether the Library 
withdrew its offer of employment because it perceived Schroer to be 
an insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or 
an inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual.”195  The court 
compared Diane’s case to an employee being fired “because she 
converts from Christianity to Judaism.”196  It explained that this 
example would be a “clear case of discrimination ‘because of 
religion.’”197  Accordingly: 
Discrimination “because of religion” easily 
encompasses discrimination because of a change of 
religion. But in cases where the plaintiff has changed 
her sex, and faces discrimination because of the 
decision to stop presenting as a man and to start 
appearing as a woman, courts have traditionally carved 
such persons out of the statute by concluding that 
“transsexuality” is unprotected by Title VII. In other 
 
187 Id. at 295. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295.  
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 299. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 305-06. 
195 Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305.  
196 Id. at 306. 
197 Id. 
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words, courts have allowed their focus on the label 
“transsexual” to blind them to the statutory language 
itself.198 
B.  Analysis of Lower Court Cases 
As established in Schwenk and Smith, subjecting a transgender 
individual to differential treatment solely because he or she is 
transgender constitutes sex discrimination as defined by the Supreme 
Court in violation of Title VII.199  Just as Crystal in Schwenk was 
treated differently by the prison guard solely because she was 
transgender, and as Jimmie in Smith was treated differently by the 
employer solely because he was a transgender, here, Gavin is being 
treated differently by the school because he is not allowed to use the 
restroom associated with his gender identity, as all the other students 
are, solely because he is a transgender.200  Like Gavin who has not 
undergone sex reassignment surgery, both Crystal Schwenk and 
Jimmie Smith had not undergone sex reassignment surgery when they 
were subjected to such differential treatment.201  Nevertheless, like 
Gavin, both Crystal Schwenk and Jimmie Smith were otherwise fully 
identifiable as the gender with which they sought to be identified.202  
Both courts recognized that the differential treatment that Crystal 
Schwenk and Jimmie Smith were subjected to constituted 
unconstitutional sex discrimination as established by the Supreme 
Court.203 
As demonstrated in Carcaño, prohibiting transgender 
individuals from using facilities consistent with the gender they 
identify with “causes significant and irreparable physical, 
psychological, economic, social, and stigmatic harm to transgender 
people including the more than 44,000 transgender adults residing in 
North Carolina . . . .”204  The privacy and safety interests that North 
 
198 Id. at 306-07. 
199 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202; Smith, 378 F.3d at 572. 
200 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202; G.G., 822 F.3d at 716; Smith, 378 F.3d at 575. 
201 G.G., 822 F.3d at 715; Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202; G.G., 822 F.3d at 716; Smith, 378 
F.3d at 575. 
202 G.G., 822 F.3d at 715; Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1193; Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.  
203 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202; Smith, 378 F.3d at 575. 
204 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff United States’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunctive Relief at 1, Carcaño v. McCrory Berger, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D. 2016) (No. 
1:16-cv-425).  
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Carolina claimed as a defense “in enacting and implementing” the state 
law “are factually baseless and legally insufficient to justify the 
discrimination.”205  This is because the “more than 44,000 transgender 
individuals” in North Carolina have been using facilities “consistent 
with their gender identity” for a long time without causing any privacy 
or safety issues.206 
As the court reasoned in Schroer, “whether viewed as 
discrimination based on the divergence between [Gavin’s] gender 
identity and ‘biological’ sex or discrimination due to gender transition, 
a policy that allows for differential treatment solely based on an 
individual’s gender or sex ‘literally discriminates because of . . . 
sex.’”207  Just as it would clearly be unconstitutional to allow for 
differential treatment of an individual who converted to another 
religion, the court must not turn a “blind eye” to the differential 
treatment to which Gavin is subjected.208  
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The Fourth Circuit should affirm its previous ruling, allowing 
the parties to appeal to the Supreme Court, which should hold that 
federally funded schools are required to allow transgender students to 
use the restroom associated with their gender identity.  First, the Fourth 
Circuit court should look to the parties who agree that it is urgent for 
the Supreme Court to hear and decide this case.209  Second, the 
Supreme Court should examine societal values, as reflected in the 
policies underlying Titles VII and IX when making its determination.  
Society seeks to protect transgender persons.210  Since President 
Trump’s withdrawal of guidance to federally-funded schools that 
allowed students to use restrooms associated with their gender identity, 
countless organizations, experts, and celebrities have all put forth great 
efforts to support the transgender community and their determination 
 
205 Id.  
206 Id. at 15. 
207 Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305. 
208 Id. at 306-07. 
209 Rowe, supra note 13. 
210 On March 2, 2017, Yelp joined 52 other companies in signing onto an amicus brief 
supporting Gavin Grimm.  Sara Ashley O’Brien, Yelp is Making it Easier to Find Gender-
Neutral Restrooms, CNN, (Mar. 3, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/03/technology/yelp-
transgender-bathroom-rights/. 
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to seek justice.211  On March 30, 2017, North Carolina repealed its state 
law, as discussed in Carcaño, which required individuals to use 
bathrooms associated with the gender on their birth certificate.212  The 
Court must focus on what really matters in this case: the well-being of 
the nation’s most vulnerable communities, like its youth.  There has 
been no claim that the students in Gavin’s school feel threatened by his 
use of the men’s restroom.  Gavin stated himself that he had “nothing 
to fear” from his peers.213  It is only the parents who have made Gavin’s 
use of the men’s restroom an issue; however, they are not the ones 
using the school bathrooms, but it is their children who are using them.  
Society not only seeks to protect order, but also to avoid abuse of the 
system.214 Finally, since the students do not have a problem with 
Gavin’s use of the men’s restroom, neither should their parents and, 
therefore, neither should a court. 
 
 
 
211 Id.  
212 Governor Roy Cooper signed the new bill, repealing the old bill and stated: “For over a 
year now, House Bill 2 has been a dark cloud hanging over our great state. It has stained our 
reputation. It has discriminated against our people and it has caused great economic harm in 
many of our communities.”  Jason Hanna, Madison Park & Eliott C. McLaughlin, North 
Carolina repeals “Bathroom Bill,” CNN, (Mar. 30, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/north-carolina-hb2-agreement/index.html.  The 
economic harm the Governor referred to refers to the fact that since North Carolina passed the 
prior bathroom law that is now repealed, business and organizations have deserted the state in 
order to express their disagreement with the law. Id.  Since that law has been repealed, the 
Governor expressed that these businesses and organizations plan to come back to the state. Id.   
213 Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7. 
214 In 2016 a man in Seattle entered a Women’s locker room and claimed that “the law has 
changed and I have a right to be here.”  Alison Morrow, Man in Women’s Locker Room Cites 
Gender Rule, KING, (Feb 16, 2016), http://www.king5.com/news/local/seattle/man-in-
womens-locker-room-cites-gender-rule/65533111.  Witnesses claimed that the man made no 
physical or verbal attempt to identify as a woman. Id.  A woman who uses this locker room 
frequently said this event was “a first” and that it was “bizarre” and questioned “why would 
anyone want to do that?”  Id.  The women said “either identify yourself as a transgender or 
you’re not and you’re just taking advantage of a loophole.”  Id.  This event, although disturbing 
and “bizarre,” pointed out a pertinent matter that the law that addresses this issue must be clear 
as to not allow for individuals like this man to take advantage of the system.  Id.  Currently, 
“there is no specific protocol as to how someone should perform gender in order to access a 
bathroom.  Morrow, supra note 214.  They just rely on verbal identification or physical 
appearance.”  In this case, the Seattle man performed neither.  Morrow, supra note 214.   
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